Robert Spencer is the popularizer of these ideas, but important scholars of the highest caliber are also telling us the same things in fully-documented books and studies, and many of their writings are excerpted on this blog as well.
Love and thanks,
How Radical Islam is Subverting America Without Guns or Bombs
The Face of Islamic Moderation?
CAIR, MPAC, and Other “Moderate” Muslim Groups
As we have seen, the U.S. government refuses to address the connection between jihadist terrorism and the theological tenets of Islam. In the government’s view, the jihadists’ argument that the Qur’an and other fundamental Islamic texts justify terrorism and Islamic supremacism is an anomaly, or even a heresy, in the Islamic world at large. U.S. policy dictates that the government work to marginalize the ostensibly small number of “extremists,” and form connections instead with representatives of the “moderate” majority of Muslims who offer a viable alternative to the “extreme” interpretation of Islam proffered by Osama bin Laden and other jihadists.
Unfortunately, the “moderate” groups to which the government turns are hardly the mainstream organizations they claim to be. When we scratch the “moderate” surface of groups such as the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) and the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC), we find links to terrorist organizations and exhortations to Islamic supremacism.
Though pursing a radical agenda, these organizations realized that extremist pronouncements and activities would be counterproductive, resulting in negative media attention and even criminal investigations. So they’ve adopted a new modus operandi—the stealth jihad. Instead of publicly proclaiming the inevitable arrival of sharia in the United States, they attempt to Islamize the United States quietly, through a long-term strategy aimed at undermining national security, forcing ever greater accommodation of Islamic practices, and minimizing any criticism whatsoever of Islam or of virtually any Muslim individual.
The Two Faces of CAIR
CAIR has clearly emerged as the leading advocacy group for Muslims in the United States. When government officials and journalists need a Muslim perspective, they are likely to turn to CAIR, which they assume is a prime example of a moderate, patriotic American Muslim organization, the very existence of which proves that the overwhelming majority of American Muslims are perfectly happy in a pluralistic republic ruled by a non-Islamic government.
CAIR, in turn, uses its connections in elite society to bolster its pretenses of being moderate and mainstream. The organization’s website features the following paeans to CAIR from congressmen and senators of both parties, as well as security and military officials:1
“This outstanding event offers an opportunity to gather and recognize the true value of the contributions CAIR provides to its members and the entire community.”—Sen. John Warner (R-VA)
“I applaud CAIR’s mission to enhance understanding and build coalitions that promote justice and mutual understanding.”—Sen. Paul Sarbanes (D-MD)
“Throughout its decade of existence, CAIR-LA has been instrumental in promoting cultural and religious understanding of the Muslim community…. I commend CAIR-LA for playing a vital role in the integration of the Muslim community into American society in an effort to promote patriotism and pride in their home country.”—Rep. Gary Miller (R-CA)
“In a difficult environment, CAIR has much to be proud of. On the key civil rights issues of our time, CAIR has been out front. Energetic, quick to enter the debate, vigilant, CAIR has earned a reputation as a force to be reckoned with. Good thing, as the stakes could not be higher.”—Rep. Dennis J. Kucinich (D-OH)
“Since the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the Los Angeles FBI has worked closely with CAIR, and a multitude of other community based organizations, to develop and foster relationships that encourage an open exchange of ideas and concerns relative to the FBI’s mission.”—J. Stephen Tidwell, assistant director in charge, Los Angeles, California Field Office of the
“[CAIR-Chicago’s] commitment to maintaining a dialogue leading to the frank and honest exchange of ideas, concerns and recommendations on issues affecting the communities we mutually serve is laudable.” —Weysan Dunn, Special Agent in Charge, Springfield, Illinois Office of the FBI
“The efforts of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) in improving cross cultural communications is commendable.”—Brigadier General Mark Wheeler, Chairman Senior National Representatives Coordination Group, United States Central Command.
CAIR presents itself as a mainstream civil rights organization for Muslims. According to CAIR spokesman Ibrahim Hooper, “We are similar to a Muslim NAACP.”‘ The group says its mission is “to enhance understanding of Islam, encourage dialogue, protect civil liberties, empower American Muslims, and build coalitions that promote justice and mutual understanding.”4
This mainstream image, however, is a carefully constructed facade behind which lies a more ambitious—and sinister—agenda. The “moderate” public statements of CAIR spokesmen may fool some politicians and a large number of gullible reporters, but the group’s radical nature is constantly being exposed by government prosecutors and terrorism experts. And the evidence compiled from CAIR officials’ own actions and words indicate beyond any doubt that CAIR is a stealth jihadist organization that ultimately seeks the imposition of Islamic law in the United States.
Perhaps the biggest blow to CAIR’s moderate facade came on June 4, 2007, when the Justice Department named CAIR an unindicted co-conspirator in the Holy Land Foundation jihad terror funding case. Identifying CAIR as a present or past member of “the U.S. Muslim Brotherhood’s Palestine Committee and/or its organizations,” federal prosecutors stated that CAIR was a participant in a criminal conspiracy on behalf of the jihad terror group Hamas, which allegedly received funding from the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLFRD), a now-defunct charity that was supported by CAIR.5
CAIR not only facilitated donations to the HLFRD, but also received half a million dollars from it. When confronted with this fact by terrorism analyst Steven Emerson in 2003, CAIR cofounder Nihad Awad vehemently denied the allegation: “This is an outright lie. Our organization did not receive any seed money from HLFRD. CAIR raises its own funds and we challenge Mt Emerson to provide even a shred of evidence to support his ridiculous claim.” Emerson duly produced the canceled check.6
CAIR’s very establishment was rooted in the jihadist movement. It arose in 1994 as a spinoff of a Hamas front group, the Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP). Founded in 1981 by Hamas operative Mousa Abu Marzook, the IAP was shut down after a jury in a terrorism-related civil suit in December 2004 found that the organization, along with other Islamic fundraisers, had funded Hamas—a ruling that an appellate court later reversed.’ According to an August 14, 2001, report from the Immigration and Naturalization Services, the IAP was dedicated to “publishing and distributing HAMAS communiques printed on IAP letterhead[s], as well as other written documentation to include the HAMAS charter and glory records, which are tributes to HAMAS’ violent ‘successes.” The same report also stated that IAP had received “approximately $490,000 from [Mousa Abu] Marzook during the period in which Marzook held his admitted role as a HAMAS leader.”‘
Emerson referred to the IAP as Hamas’s “primary voice in the United States,” while a former chief of the FBI’s counter-terrorism department, Oliver Revell, called the IAP “a front organization for Hamas that engages in propaganda for Islamic militants.”9
This was the organization that gave birth to CAIR, whose cofounders, Nihad Awad and Omar Ahmad, served as IAP’s president and public relations director, respectively. 10
Since then, CAIR’s current and former leaders are continually forced to explain the tremendous gap between the radical statements they made and the ties to jihadist groups they maintained in the past, and the “moderate” face that CAIR struggles to project today. These statements include the declarations discussed in chapter one, such as Ahmad’s assertion that “Islam isn’t in America to be equal to any other faith, but to become dominant,” as well as Hooper’s own stated preference for “the government of the United States to be Islamic sometime in the future.” Today, Ahmad denies uttering the quote, while Hooper, in his prolific television appearances, now refrains from such direct utterances of support for Islamic supremacism.
Awad has shown the same tendency. In 1994 at Barry University in Florida, Awad proclaimed, “I’m in support of [the] Hamas movement more than the PLO””—an unsurprising statement coming from the former president of a Hamas front group. How ever, Awad’s open support for Hamas became a liability in 2006, when a Muslim candidate for Congress, Keith Ellison (D-MN), came under fire for his ties to CAIR. So Awad conveniently moderated his position, declaring, “I don’t support Hamas today. My position and CAIR’s position is extremely clear—we condemn suicide bombings. We are mainstream American Muslims.”12
A final example is provided by the prominent U.S. Muslim spokesman Siraj Wahhaj, who is a former member of CAIR’s advisory board. In the early 1990s he sponsored talks in New York City and New Jersey mosques by Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, the “blind sheikh” now imprisoned for conspiring to blow up the World Trade Center in 1993. In fact, Wahhaj was designated a “potential unindicted co-conspirator” in the case.” This is all consistent with Wahhaj’s stated political and religious views, which include a warning that the United States will fall unless it “accepts the Islamic agenda.”14
But soon after September 11, Wahhaj began singing a new tune. He pledged his efforts against the ideology of those who brought down the twin towers: “I now feel responsible to preach, actually to go on a jihad against extremism.”” Gone are the assertions of Islamic supremacism—at least, they’re gone from the statements he makes in public. Having completely overhauled his image, Wahhaj is now often trotted out by the media as a spokesman for “moderate” Muslims.
CAIR’s ties to the stealth jihad are manifold. It was connected to the notorious “Flying Imams” lawsuit, in which six Muslim clerics sued US Airways in 2007 after they were removed from a flight for suspicious behavior. Their lawyer was Omar T. Mohammedi, a former president of CAIR’s New York chapter.” The imams also initially sued the anonymous passengers who reported them, before House Republicans pushed through ameasure protecting whistleblowers in such circumstances.17 If successful, this effort would have been an immensely important contribution to the stealth jihad, for it would have essentially placed Muslims beyond the pale of security-related scrutiny; anyone who reported suspicious behavior by a Muslim in an airport or airplane would have faced a real risk of being sued for discrimination.
With such a record, it should come as no surprise that CAIR has financial ties to the virulently supremacist Islamic Wahhabi sect promoted by Saudi Arabia. According to its Form 990 filings for 2003, CAIR invested $325,000 from its California offices with the North American Islamic Trust (NAIT). According to a September 2002 Newsweek report, “NAIT money has helped the Saudi Arabian sect of Wahhabism—or Salafism, as the broader, pan-Islamic movement is called—to seize control of hundreds of mosques in U.S. Muslim communities.”” NAIT also shows up among the allied organizations listed in the 1991 Muslim Brotherhood “grand jihad” memorandum on its strategy in the United States—along with the Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP), CAIR’s predecessor.
The Muslim Brotherhood itself is extremely uncomfortable answering questions about its relationship with CAIR; Brotherhood officials don’t want to undermine CAIR by acknowledging a close relationship, but they’re also reluctant to deny outright their tight connection with a friendly organization. Their discomfort in discussing this topic becomes almost comical, as evident in this interview by an Egyptian blogger with Mohamed Habib, the second highest-ranking Brotherhood official:
Blogger: Is there a Muslim Brotherhood in the U.S.?
Mohamed Habib I would say yes. There are Muslim Brotherhood members there ….
Blogger: This is naturally very important. Who represents you in the US?
Mohamed Habib: Well, there are there those who do represent us, who do that role.
Blogger: But it’s not CAIR, right? The Council for American Islamic Relations? Many people say that they are your front. Other people say that its ISNA. But back to CAIR, some people from the Muslim Brotherhood have denied having a connection with CAIR. Do they really represent you?
Mohamed Habib: Ehh, this is a sensitive subject, and it’s kind of problematic, especially after 9/11 …
Blogger: For them to say that there is a relationship between you two?
Mohamed Habib: Yes. You can say that.
Despite its careful image makeover, the evidence of CAIR’s real, radical agenda is so overwhelming that some security experts have been warning about the group for years. For example, Steven Emerson has for years called CAIR “a radical fundamentalist front group for Hamas,”20 while Steven Pomerantz, the FBI’s former chief of counterterrorism, stated long before CAIR was named as an unindicted co-conspirator in the Holy Land Foundation case that “CAIR, its leaders, and its activities effectively give aid to international terrorist groups.”2′
And politicians are catching on as well. According to Senator Richard Durbin (D-IL), CAIR is “unusual in its extreme rhetoric and its associations with groups that are suspect.” Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY) has asserted that CAIR “has ties to terrorism” and “intimate links with Hamas.”22 Congressman Bill Shuster (R-PA) has bemoaned the fact that “time and again the organization has shown itself to be nothing more than an apologist for groups bent on the destruction of Israel and Islamic domination over the West.” 23
Finally, CAIR’s role in the stealth jihad is well known to American victims of terrorism. The family of former FBI counterterrorism chief John P. O’Neill, Sr., who was killed on September 11 in the World Trade Center, has named CAIR in a lawsuit as having “been part of the criminal conspiracy of radical Islamic terrorism” responsible for the September 11 atrocities. The lawsuit charges that CAIR has “actively sought to hamper governmental anti-terrorism efforts by direct propaganda activities aimed at police, first-responders, and intelligence agencies through so-called sensitivity training. Their goal is to create as much self-doubt, hesitation, fear of name-calling, and litigation within police departments and intelligence agencies as possible so as to render such authorities ineffective in pursuing international and domestic terrorist entities.” Although judges have thrown out a section of the lawsuit that seeks to hold Saudi Arabia’s leaders responsible for the September 11 attacks, the courts have not yet ruled on the remainder of the suit.24
The charges contained in the lawsuit point to the seamlessness between CAIR’s non-violent civil activities and the violent jihad.
While eschewing violence themselves, CAIR officials work to hinder the fight against Islamic terrorism. They aim to accomplish this by placing Muslims beyond legal scrutiny through the denunciation of citizens, analysts, officials, and prosecutors who voice concerns about any Muslims as “Islamophobes.” While the campaign that was most potentially damaging to national security—the Flying Imams lawsuit—was largely neutralized by Congressional action, CAIR has not abandoned its fight to place Muslims above the law.
The CAIR Arrests
Perhaps Nihad Awad and fellow CAIR cofounder Omar Ahmad left the IAP and formed CAIR because they had renounced IAP’s “extremism” and had become moderates. If they did, however, they evidently still had some trouble distinguishing moderates from extremists, as shown by the arrest records of people they welcomed into their new organization.
For example, take Randall Todd (“Ismail”) Royer, who began working with CAIR in 1997 and served as CAIR’s communications specialist and civil rights coordinator. He was part of the “Virginia jihad network,” which was indicted on forty-one counts of “conspiracy to train for and participate in a violent jihad overseas” in association with Lashkar-e-Taiba, a jihad terrorist group. Said a prosecutor about the group, “Ten miles from Capitol Hill in the streets of northern Virginia, American citizens allegedly met, plotted, and recruited for violent jihad.” Of the eleven Muslim men charged in the case, six pleaded guilty, three were convicted at trial, and two were acquitted. The group’s spiritual leader, Ali al-Timimi, received a life sentence. Matthew Epstein of the Investigative Project has said that Royer helped recruit the other member of the group to the jihad while he was working for CAIR.25
Royer was also among those charged in a separate indictment alleging that the group conspired to help al Qaeda and the Taliban fight against U.S. troops in Afghanistan. And Royer admitted to a grand jury that he had already waged jihad warfare in Bosnia—and that his commander took orders from Osama bin Laden.
According to Daniel Pipes, “Royer eventually pleaded guilty to lesser firearms-related charges, and the former CAIR staffer was sentenced to twenty years in prison.”26
In a statement on its website, CAIR reminds readers twice in two sentences that Royer did not plead guilty to any terror charge: “In January 2004, Royer pleaded guilty to weapons charges and did not plead guilty to any charge of ‘terrorism.’ Notwithstanding the fact that any criminal action to which he pleaded guilty was done when Royer was no longer employed with CAIR and not at CAIR’s direction, it is important to note that the only crimes that he pleaded guilty to were weapons charges, not charges of terrorism.”27
The statement sounds the most resonant left-liberal notes in associating reports about the arrests of the officials with McCarthyism and the attempts to smear Martin Luther King: “This is probably the most widely recycled example of McCarthy-like attempts to portray CAIR as guilty by association. Such efforts evoke memories of attempts to smear Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. as a communist or womanizer.” Furthermore, “When Aldrich Ames (CIA) and Robert Hanssen (FBI) admitted to being spies for foreign governments, it did not automatically associate the CIA or FBI with being complicit in any of these criminal activities.”
And CAIR, an organization that so frequently travels in defamation and ad hominem smears of its opponents, couldn’t resist characterizing criticism of its employment of jihadist criminals such as Royer as a bigoted attack against all Muslims, charging that “only Islamophobes will assign guilt to Muslims by such false associations. These smears against CAIR are disseminated by agenda-driven extremists who seek to marginalize and disenfranchise the American Muslim community and its leaders.”28
But is it really equivalent to blaming the CIA and FBI for Ames and Hanssen to see in Royer’s actions an indictment of CAIR? The key difference is that the CIA and FBI did not preach the philosophy that Ames and Hanssen acted upon in their espionage; they were, in fact, transgressing against the principles they had promised to uphold when they took their agency jobs. But wasn’t Royer transgressing against CAIR’s avowed purpose of building bridges between Muslims and non-Muslims, encouraging dialogue, and condemning terrorism? Certainly; but he was not at all transgressing against the principles of Hamas, with which CAIR is so closely entwined, or against the Islamic supremacist principles that Ahmad and Hooper have enunciated.
Another CAIR official involved in jihad activity is Ghassan Elashi, the founder of CAIR’s Texas chapter. He was charged with giving Hamas more than $12 million while he was running the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, the charity that has earned CAIR the designation of unindicted coconspirator. In July 2004 Elashi was convicted of shipping computers illegally to two state-sponsors of terrorism, Libya and Syria. Then in April 2005 he was convicted of knowingly doing business with Mousa Abu Marzook, the senior Hamas leader who founded IAP, some of whose members later created CAIR. He was found guilty of a number of charges, including conspiracy and money laundering.29
Regarding Elashi, CAIR points out that it has “hundreds of board members and employees and some 50,000 members. It would be illogical and unfair to hold CAIR responsible for the personal activities of all these people. The fact that Elashi was once associated with one of our more than thirty regional chapters has no legal significance to our corporation given the fact that any actions taken by him were outside the scope and chronology of his association with one of our chapters.'”
This wording is interesting—Elashi’s association with CAIR has no “legal significance” for the organization, “given the fact that any actions taken by him were outside the scope and chronology of his association with one of our chapters.” This appears to be claiming that CAIR bears no legal responsibility for Elashi’s activities and cannot be included in his prosecution. Fair enough. But conspicuously unstated, in their comments on both Royer and Elashi, is any condemnation of their jihadist actions, or of the philosophy underlying those actions. And since Elashi was doing business with Marzook, who founded IAP, CAIR’s predecessor, it is in no sense wild speculation to consider the possibility that Elashi’s actions were consistent with, rather than contradictory to, CAIR’s actual purposes in the United States. The organization’s strangely worded disavowal of Elashi only raises more questions.
The parade of disgraced CAIR officials continues with the March 2003 arrest of Bassem K. Khafagi on charges of bank fraud. News reports identified him as the community affairs director for CAIR’s national office in Washington, although CAIR stated that he was “never an employee of CAIR.” It acknowledged, however, that he was “an independent contractor for CAIR, effective November 2, 2001.”31 An organization he helped found, the Islamic Assembly of North America (IANA), was suspected of providing websites for two radical Sheikhs with ties to Osama bin Laden.32 Prosecutors charged that the IANA was dedicated to spreading the “radical Islamic ideology, the purpose of which was indoctrination, recruitment of members, and the instigation of acts of violence and terrorism.”
CAIR, however, notes that “on September 10, 2003, EI-Khafagi pleaded guilty to charges of bank and visa fraud. Bank and visa fraud are criminal offenses and not crimes of terrorism. Surely if there had been strong evidence of terrorist activities, the Justice Department would have vigorously pursued those avenues and not allowed him to plead guilty to non-terrorism related charges.” 34
Maybe, maybe not. Given the state of the legal system today, with overloaded dockets and overworked prosecutors and investigators, this assumption is not sound. And here again, CAIR is hewing closely to legal niceties—Khafagi was an independent contractor, not an employee, and pled guilty to bank and visa fraud, not terrorism—while sidestepping the central issues: How did people such as Royer, Elashi, and Khafagi get involved with CAIR in the first place, if the organization is truly moderate and condemns jihad terrorism? How did these men get through the interviewing process? Surely CAIR screens in some way not only prospective employees, but also independent contractors and board members. The Islamic world is engulfed in an immense international upheaval, with millions of jihadists claiming to represent “true Islam” and recruiting among peaceful Muslims on that basis, and somehow that subject never came up when CAIR officials were getting to know Randall Royer, or Bassam Khafagi, or Ghassan
CAIR’s “Condemnation” of Terrorism
When asked whether they condemn terrorism, CAIR officials frequently point to the organization’s endorsement of a fatwa, or religious ruling, against terrorism issued on July 28, 2005, by the Fiqh Council of North America, an eighteen-member board of Islamic scholars and leaders. The declaration received international publicity as one of the few instances after the September 11 attacks in which Muslims unequivocally declared that those attacks were carried out in defiance of the principles of Islam. The Fiqh Council reissued this fatwa in substantially the same form on Thanksgiving Day 2007, again to great fanfare.35
The original fatwa affirmed “Islam’s absolute condemnation of terrorism and religious extremism.” It declared that “Islam strictly condemns religious extremism and the use of violence against innocent lives. There is no justification in Islam for extremism or terrorism.” Foreshadowing the State Department’s 2008 guidelines directing American officials to refer to jihadists as nondenominational criminals or evildoers, it declared, “Targeting civilians’ life and property through suicide bombings or any other method of attack is haram—or forbidden—and those who commit these barbaric acts are criminals, not `martyrs.`” The statement continued:
The Qur’an, Islam’s revealed text, states: “Whoever kills a person [unjustly] …it is as though he has killed all mankind. And whoever saves a life, it is as though he had saved all mankind. (Qur’an, 5:32)
Prophet Muhammad said there is no excuse for committing unjust acts: “Do not be people without minds of your own, saying that if others treat you well you will treat them well, and that if they do wrong you will do wrong to them. Instead, accustom yourselves to do good if people do good and not to do wrong (even) if they do evil.” (Al-Tirmidhi)
Extrapolating from such principles, the Fiqh Council declared:
In the light of the teachings of the Qur’an and Sunnah we clearly and strongly state:
All acts of terrorism targeting civilians are haram (forbidden) in Islam.
It is haram for a Muslim to cooperate with any individual or group that is involved in any act of terrorism or violence.
It is the civic and religious duty of Muslims to cooperate with law enforcement authorities to protect the lives of all civilians.36
In any case, these are not the unequivocal condemnations of jihad violence that many non-Muslim analysts have taken them to be. The chief weakness of both declarations is that they don’t define their terms. While non-Muslim Westerners may assume a particular meaning for “terrorism,” “innocent lives,” and “civilians,” these are in fact hotly debated terms in the Islamic world.
For example, Anjem Choudhury, a spokesman for a leading jihad group in Britain, told an interviewer that the victims of the July 7, 2005 bombings in London were not “innocent,” because they were not Muslims: “When we say innocent people, we mean Muslims. As far as non-Muslims are concerned, they have not accepted Islam. As far we are concerned, that is a crime against God …. As far as Muslims are concerned, you’re innocent if you are a Muslim. Then you are innocent in the eyes of God. If you are non-Muslim, then you are guilty of not believing in God.””
This argument is by no means uncommon in the Muslim world. A Palestinian Arab jihadist expressed a similar sentiment in justifying attacks on Israeli civilians. “There are no civilians in Israel. All the Israelis are military, all of them,” he insisted. “They are all military and they all have weapons and guns, and the moment they are called up they are going to be using their weapons against me.”39 The Tunisian jihadist Rashid al-Ghannushi has issued a fatwa to the same effect, declaring, “There are no civilians in Israel. The population—males, females, and children—are the army reserve soldiers, and thus can be killed.”40
What’s more, this view—that there are no innocent civilians among Muslims’ perceived enemies—is not confined to some extremist Islamic fringe. The internationally influential Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, who was won praise from Islamic scholar John Esposito for engaging in a “reformist interpretation of Islam and its relationship to democracy, pluralism and human rights,” addressed the morality of suicide bombings against Israeli women and civilians thus: “Israeli women are not like women in our society because Israeli women are militarised. Secondly, I consider this type of martyrdom operation as indication of justice of Allah almighty. Allah is just. Through his infinite wisdom he has given the weak what the strong do not possess and that is the ability to turn their bodies into bombs like the Palestinians do.”41
And this viewpoint is by no means limited to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. According to the Middle East Media Research Institute, the day after the London bombings, Dr. Hani Al-Siba’i, director of the Al-Maqreze Centre for Historical Studies in London, said on Al-Jazeera, “The term ‘civilians’ does not exist in Islamic religious law…. I’m familiar with religious law. There is no such term as ‘civilians’ in the modern Western sense. People are either of Dar Al-Harb [House of War] or not.”42
The fact that a significant number of Muslims, including such high-profile figures as Qaradawi, hold such views illustrates the inadequacy of the statements issued by the Fiqh Council of North America. Were the issuers of these statements, and its supporters such as CAIR, really trying to convince their fellow Muslims that contemporary jihad terrorism is illegitimate? If so, it was not enough to condemn “terrorism”—not enough, that is, if the council was trying to win over to their point of view people who don’t believe that what they are doing constitutes terrorism at all. It is not enough to condemn the killing of “innocent civilians” when the jihadists don’t believe their victims are either innocent or civilians.
Moreover, CAIR officials have repeatedly declined to condemn Hamas and Hizballah as terrorist groups. Although they will issue such a condemnation when it’s politically necessary—such as Awad’s disavowal of Hamas during Keith Ellison’s election campaign—CAIR representatives really don’t like to speak ill of such organizations. When a reporter from the Los Angeles Times asked a CAIR spokeswoman, Munira Syeda, to condemn Hamas or Hizballah as terrorist groups, she responded, “I don’t understand what the relevance is.”43 In April 2007 I participated in a heated hour-long radio debate with CAIR’s Hussam Ayloush, during which I asked him repeatedly to condemn Hamas and Hizballah as terrorist groups. He refused.
MPAC: Good Cop to CAIR’s Bad Cop?
Another prominent Muslim organization shares all of CAIR’s claims to moderation and on the surface seems to have few, if any, of CAIR’s shortcomings: the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC). Immediately after the July 7, 2005 London bombings, MPAC appeared to issue an unequivocal condemnation of the bombers and of terrorism in general. “Any individual or group that claims that these heinous actions serve as a redress for legitimate grievances,” MPAC thundered, “is dreadfully mistaken. MPAC condemns the exploitation of people and issues, regardless of the perpetrators and their justifications. This assault is unmistakably an act of terrorism, an attack against humanity.””
In a July 12, 2005 statement, the organization went farther: “MPAC has never supported any organizations that support or utilize violence—i.e. terrorism, suicide bombings, beheadings, etc. To do so would be antithetical to the values of sanctity of human life, justice, mercy, and equality for all that make up MPAC’s vision statement. In fact, MPAC officials have frequently been on record unequivocally condemning all varieties of violence committed in the name of religion.”45
As in CAIR’s case, such words are welcome but ultimately hollow without deeds to back them up. And far more than CAIR, MPAC can claim that it has done those deeds. For several years after September 11, the group touted its “National Anti-Terrorism Campaign,” garnering uncritical publicity in the media and even praise from government officials. The campaign proclaimed, “It is our duty as American Muslims to protect our country and to contribute to its betterment.”46 MPAC calls for “religious awareness and education to create a strong Islamic environment that does not allow terrorism to be considered as a form of struggle in Islam. The different acceptable forms of struggle in Islam are part of the noble concept of jihad. This doesn’t tolerate hurting civilians, suicidal destruction of human life or inflicting harm on non-combatants. “47
This statement, however, had all the weaknesses of the Fiqh Council’s fatwa against terrorism. If MPAC really hopes to have an impact against this kind of thinking among Muslims, it must confront and refute it on Islamic grounds. Its campaign against terrorism did not address that need.
The campaign’s inadequacy is evident, among other points, in MPAC’s rejection of the “suicidal destruction of human life,” a formulation that assumes what it has to establish: that suicide bombing should indeed be classified as suicide and thus considered to be forbidden in Islamic law. This is a much-disputed point; Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, for example, argues that such bombers are not, in fact, suicidal: “It’s not suicide, it is martyrdom in the name of God, Islamic theologians and jurisprudents have debated this issue. Referring to it as a form of jihad, under the title of jeopardising the life of the mujahideen. It is allowed to jeopardise your soul and cross the path of the enemy and be killed.”48
How would MPAC propose to disabuse Muslims of such ideas? This should be the only point of Muslim anti-terror campaigns: to convince Muslims that violence and supremacism are not part of their faith. A simple way to do this would be to declare unequivocally two things: that non-Muslim non-combatants always qualify as civilians just like Muslim non-combatants do, and that suicide bombings are, in fact, a form of suicide, and therefore prohibited. But MPAC, like CAIR and the Fiqh Council, made no such statement.
MPAC does, however, convey the appearance of working to do just that: it declares that its intention is to “send a clear message to our fellow citizens that terrorism is not a part of our faith, and that we stand shoulder-to-shoulder with them against terrorism and religious extremism.”49 To this end, it calls on mosques to “have a relationship that involves public meetings with the FBI’s regional office and local law enforcement” and recommends arrangement of programs “in cooperation with local law enforcement agencies to educate and train the community on how to really detect criminal activities.””
Such media-friendly proclamations generate a lot of sympathetic coverage. But in its communications with its own supporters, MPAC appears concerned less with rooting out jihadists from within American Muslim communities than with protecting Muslims from uncomfortable attention from law enforcement. This question appears in a Frequently Asked Questions section of the MPAC anti-terror campaign: “By engaging the FBI and law enforcement, aren’t we collaborating with the very agencies trampling our civil rights?” The response: “Actually, it has been MPAC’s experience that working with local FBI field offices helps protect our civil liberties …. Engagement of local law enforcement and local FBI field offices is absolutely critical in protecting our civil liberties. It counters the basic human weakness to make assumptions about a person/community which they have never been in contact with before.”
Answering that question might have been a good opportunity for MPAC to tell American Muslims that the best way they could quell suspicions about their loyalties would be to cooperate fully and openly with anti-terror investigations—that the most effective way to protect their civil liberties would be to demonstrate with decisive action their commitment to protecting and defending the safety of the United States and the stability of its constitutional government. But instead MPAC adopts a defensive tone, portraying its call to cooperate with the police as an attempt to defend Muslims’ civil liberties—as opposed to root out terrorists—and later in the website vehemently disavowing any intention to call on American Muslims to ” ‘spy’ on each other”: “Absolutely not. The thought is anathema to our purpose as an organization.””
This amounts to an admission that MPAC is not asking Muslims to report on suspicious activity in U.S. mosques. The statement goes on to assert that “when legitimate differences with our government’s policies translate into un-Islamic and illegal behavior the Quran obligates us to speak up and act.” MPAC, however, does not define what constitutes “un-Islamic and illegal behavior” with any specificity. With Islamic jihadists portraying their activity as simple loyalty to core Islamic principles—in fact, just the opposite of un-Islamic and illegal behavior—how effective can MPAC’s anti-terror campaign be?
The rest of MPAC’s recommendations are in the same vein, appearing to be more concerned about misbehavior by non-Muslim law enforcement officials in mosques than the possibility of terrorist activity in those mosques.
Its focus is misplaced in other ways as well. It recommends, for example, that “all activities within the mosque and Islamic centers should be authorized by legitimate, acknowledged leadership.”52 That sounds great until one realizes that if a mosque is involved in or sympathetic to terrorist activity, this is probably not because unauthorized persons have somehow wormed their way in among the moderate community. It is much more likely that the jihadist sentiments will come from the mosque leadership–as per the statement by Naqshbandi Sufi leader Sheikh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani that 80 percent of U.S. mosques are controlled by extremists. MPAC, contrary to its professions of moderation, has not examined Kabbani’s charges in any serious way, or developed any programs to counter the jihad ideology and Islamic supremacism within U.S. mosques. Instead, it dismissed Kabbani’s statements as “an offhand remark in 1998 … in some obscure presentation.””
But as we saw in chapter four, Kabbani’s charges were not made as an “offhand remark,” but as prepared testimony, and not in some “obscure presentation,” but before a State Department Open Forum. (MPAC achieved a perfect trifecta by also getting the date wrong—Kabbani made his presentation not in 1998, but on January 7, 1999.)” Why would MPAC dismiss Kabbani’s statement? What would be the result of dismissing without serious investigation the possibility that Islamic supremacists and jihadists control 80 percent of the mosques in the United States? The only beneficiary would be those Islamic supremacists themselves, who—if they are indeed active in mosques in America—would be able to continue their stealth jihad activities unhindered.
Resistance to Terrorism is Terrorism!
MPAC has also trafficked in moral equivalence between jihadists and anti-jihadists regarding Israel. It was no surprise when the organization joined CAIR and other groups in 2004 in signing a “Joint Muslims/Arab-American Statement on Israel Violence in Gaza.” The organizations echoed some of the most virulent rhetoric that jihadists employ in their offensives against the Jewish state, condemning “Israel’s recent indiscriminate killings of innocent Palestinians, including many children,” without even mentioning the targeting by Palestinian suicide bombers of Israeli citizens on buses and in restaurants, or the Israeli government’s diametrically opposed policy of never targeting civilians.”
Such extreme rhetoric was nothing new for MPAC. On the afternoon of September 11, 2001, on a Los Angeles radio show, MPAC’s Salam al-Maryati added fuel to the wildest, most paranoid conspiracy theories about the attacks that had just unfolded: “If we’re going to look at suspects we should look to the groups that benefit the most from these kinds of incidents, and I think we should put the state of Israel on the suspect list because I think this diverts attention from what’s happening in the Palestinian territories so that they can go on with their aggression and occupation and apartheid policies.””
This was not al-Maryati’s only outburst of anti-Israeli malevolence. Daniel Pipes recounts a “February 1996 incident when a Palestinian named Muhammad Hamida shouted the fundamentalist war cry, Allahu Akbar (Allah is Great), as he drove his car intentionally into a crowded bus stop in Jerusalem, killing one Israeli and injuring 23 others. Before he could escape or hurt anyone else, Hamida was shot dead. Commenting on the affair, Mr. Al-Marayati said not a word about Hamida’s murderous rampage but instead focused on Hamida’s death, which he called `a provocative act,’ and demanded the extradition of his executors to America ‘to be tried in a U.S. court’ on terrorism charges.”57
Similarly, Ahmed Younis, who was at that time MPAC’s national director, declared in March 2005, according to Pipes, “that Adolf Eichmann was himself a Jew, so in fact Jews killed themselves in the Holocaust.””
Like their counterparts at CAIR, MPAC officials are reluctant to condemn specific Islamic terrorist organizations. In fact, they have publicly expressed a disturbing sympathy for Islamic terrorists. Al-Maryati in 1996 equated violent jihadists with the Founding Fathers: “Most Islamic movements have been branded as terrorists as a result of the rising extremism from a handful of militants. American freedom fighters hundreds of years ago were also regarded as terrorists by the British.”” Two years later, MPAC Senior Advisor Maher Hathout told the National Press Club that the terrorist group “Hizballah is fighting for freedom . . . . This is legitimate.” That same year, when the U.S. struck al Qaeda sites in Afghanistan and Sudan, Hathout was furious: “Our country,” he sputtered, “is committing an act of terrorism. What we did is illegal, immoral, unhuman, unacceptable, stupid and un-American.”60
MPAC’s Jihad Against Steven Emerson
If MPAC is indeed committed to rooting out Islamic extremists and terrorists, then it is strange that it has chosen one of the most prominent terrorism analysts as the chief target of a media smear campaign.61 At a conference on “Countering Religious & Political Extremism” held on December 18, 2004 (and later televised on C-Span), MPAC distributed a forty-eight-page booklet attacking not Osama bin Laden, or his lieutenant Ayman al-Zawahiri, or the then-leader of al Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, but Steven Emerson. Entitled “Counterproductive Counterterrorism,” the booklet sought to frame opposition to Emerson as a national security issue, labeling his anti-terror efforts “anti-Muslim” after the manner of CAIR’s attacks on others it deemed “Islamophobes”: “In order to enhance the security of our country, it is necessary to expose the vocal minority of Americans who continue to exploit the tragedy of September 11 to advance their pre-existing anti-Muslim agenda.” MPAC excoriated Emerson for asserting that “political correctness enforced by American Muslim groups has limited the public’s knowledge about the spread of radical Islam in the U.S.”—yet its report attempted to do just that by discrediting one of the chief investigators of jihadist operations in the United States.62
It is revealing that MPAC would think that Emerson is doing so much damage—to the security of our country, no less—as to call for such a response. Emerson’s anti-terror work has won accolades from across the political spectrum. Former National Security Council Counterterrorism official Richard Clarke, widely viewed as virtually the sole government analyst to warn of the imminent threat presented by al Qaeda before September 11, said of Emerson, “I think of Steve as the Paul Revere of terrorism,” adding that through Emerson’s briefings, “We’d always learn things we weren’t hearing from the FBI or CIA, things which almost always proved to be true.”63
MPAC’s report cites as one of Emerson’s “wild accusations” the “declaration that Muslim terrorist sympathizers were hanging out at the White House.” Emerson’s “accusation,” however, is indisputable: Islamic activist Abdurrahman Alamoudi, now serving a twenty-three-year prison sentence after pleading guilty in a Libyan-related terrorism financing case, was at one time, in the words of Daniel Pipes, “a Washington fixture. He had many meetings with both Clintons in the White House and once joined George W Bush at a prayer service. He arranged a Ramadan fast-breaking dinner for congressional leaders. He six times lectured abroad for the State Department and founded an organization to provide Muslim chaplains for the Department of Defense. “64 Nor was Alamoudi the only one: Sami Al-Arian, who ultimately pled guilty to a charge of conspiracy to aid Palestinian Islamic Jihad in the United States, attended a White House briefing by a senior Bush administration official in June 2001.”
Now, why would MPAC object to light being shed on the activities of the likes of Alamoudi and al-Arian?
MPAC’S Muslim Brotherhood Connections
The MPAC report charges that “Emerson’s lack of precision leads him to conflate legitimate organizations that can help America and secure the homeland with others that are neither genuinely American nor transparent.” Here it becomes clear why MPAC is in such a froth about Emerson: because of what he knows about MPAC itself. In American Jihad, Emerson notes that when Alamoudi encouraged the crowd at an October 2000 rally cosponsored by MPAC to declare their support of the jihad terror groups Hamas and Hizballah, “MPAC’s Political Advisor, Mandi Bray, stood directly behind Alamoudi and was seen jubilantly exclaiming his support for these two deadly terrorist organizations.” This was just three weeks after Bray “coordinated and led a rally where approximately 2,000 people congregated in front of the Israeli Embassy in Washington, D.C.” Emerson reports that “at one point during the rally, Mandi Bray played the tambourine as one of the speakers sang, while the crowd repeated: ‘Al-Aqsa [Mosque] is calling us, let’s all go into jihad, and throw stones at the face of the Jews.'”66
In contrast to the image presented by MPAC’s anti-terror campaign, Emerson’s Investigative Project has documented the group’s indefatigable and consistent opposition to the war on terror; the MPAC-linked magazine The Minaret has dismissed key anti-terror operations as part of “[t]he American crusade against Islam and Muslims.”67 Emerson has called attention to the fact that in a book called In Fraternity: A Message to Muslims in America, coauthor Hassan Hathout, a former MPAC president, is identified as “a close disciple of the late Hassan al-Banna of Egypt.”” The Minaret spoke of Hassan Hathout’s closeness to al-Banna in a 1997 article: “My father would tell me that Hassan Hathout was a companion of Hassan al-Banna. . . . Hassan Hathout would speak of al-Banna with such love and adoration; he would speak of a relationship not guided by politics or law but by a basic sense of human decency.”69
Al-Banna, of course, founded the Muslim Brotherhood, the foremost stealth jihad organization, in Egypt in 1928.
On May 23, 2007, Emerson appeared on CNBC’s Kudlow and Company opposite Edina Lekovic, MPAC’s communications director. During a contentious exchange, Emerson brought up “something that Ms. Edina Lekovic should be very familiar with: `When we hear someone refer to the great Mujahid Osama bin Laden, as a ‘terrorist,’ we should defend our brother and refer to him as a freedom fighter; someone who has forsaken wealth and power to fight in Allah’s cause and speak out against oppressors.” Emerson noted that “this statement was made after the ’98 bombing [in Kenya and Tanzania], and this was made in Al-Talib magazine.” Al-Talib is the publication of the UCLA chapter of the Muslim Students Association, and Emerson noted that Lekovic was editor of Al-Talib when this statement was made.
Lekovic became enraged. “Absolutely no. No, I was not. These are lies,” she exclaimed. When Emerson stood by his statement, Lekovic insisted, “No, these are absolute mischaracterizations. Mr. Emerson, your research is—your research is sloppy.” She told Emerson, “For your research—for your research to point out and to conduct this kind of character assassination is quite ridiculous.”70
Unfortunately for Lekovic and MPAC, however, Emerson later produced a copy of the July 1999 issue of Al-Talib, showing that Lekovic was listed as a managing editor of the magazine on the same page on which the praise of bin Laden appeared.71 But this too Lekovic brushed aside in a subsequent statement. She characterized Emerson’s charge as the “latest desperate attempt at mudslinging” and herself as a “well-respected mainstream Muslim American leader.” Emerson, she said, “maliciously attempted to paint me as a supporter of terrorism based on a student publication I briefly worked with while an undergrad at UCLA.”
What about the masthead of July 1999 issue of Al-Talib? It was a “printing mistake which I had no part in, but which [Emerson] has exploited to serve his agenda. For reasons unknown to me, given that I had already graduated at that time, my name is listed in the staff box as a managing editor of that issue. I had graduated and had no participation in campus life by that time. I had no role in the publication of that issue of the magazine and I had no part in the writing of the article to which he refers.”
A simple mistake, then? Emerson in reply noted that “from October 1997 to May 2002, in addition to the July 1999 ‘The Spirit of Jihad’ issue, there are at least 11 other issues of the newspaper which list Ms. Lekovic as either ‘managing editor,’ `copy editor,’ `assistant editor’ `writer,’ or give her ‘special thanks.
That’s a high number of printing mistakes—and it’s especially curious that Al-Talib would have continued to list Lekovic on the staff three years after she had graduated, if she indeed had no involvement with the magazine.
In an appalling but increasingly common display of moral inversion, MPAC implied that Emerson and others were equivalent to Islamic terrorists. In a Frequently Asked Questions section about its anti-terror campaign, MPAC’s website posed the question: “Why does this campaign focus just on Muslims? Why not extremists amongst Christians and Jews?” The answer: “Without doubt Christian extremists such as Pat Robertson, Jerry Falwell, and Franklin Graham or Jewish extremists such as Daniel Pipes and Steve Emerson need to be held accountable for their falsehoods and distortions.”
If Robertson, Falwell, Graham, Pipes or Emerson were beheading and blowing people up in the name of their religion, this equation of “extremists” might be justified. But in reality it is a ghastly bit of character assassination.
And it gets worse. MPAC continues: “But let’s face it, if another terrorist attack occurs Christians and Jews will not be the ones rounded up or have their civil liberties effected [sic].”73
Let’s face it indeed. No one of any stature in the U.S., not Emerson or anyone else, has ever recommended “rounding up” Muslims. And if Muslims are the focus of any special scrutiny when it comes to security-related issues, it’s not because of some irrational prejudice fanned by “Islamophobes,” but because it is Muslim groups—not Christian or Jewish ones—that are behind the vast majority of terrorist attacks in the world.
It lies within the power of the Islamic community in the United States, and flagship organizations such as CAIR and MPAC, to head off such suspicions by working forthrightly against the jihad ideology: instituting transparent programs, open for inspection, teaching against the ideology of Islamic supremacism, and against any idea that Muslims should work to impose the societal and political aspects of sharia in the United States.
But neither organization is doing that. Nor is any other major Islamic organization in the country. They have a different agenda altogether, one that finds expression in campaigns such as the Flying Imams lawsuit and MPAC’s unhinged assaults on the state of Israel.
With “moderate” organizations like CAIR and MPAC, who needs “extremists”?
Notes to Chapter Five
1. “What They Say about CAIR,” Council on American-Islamic Relations, www.cair.com.
2. “CAIR-Chicago, Muslims, Meet With U.S. Customs & Border Protection at O’Hare Airport,” CAIR-Illinois, June 26, 2006, http://www.cairchicago.org/ournews.php?file.on_airportvisit06262006.
3. Daniel Pipes and Sharon Chadha, “CAIR: Islamists Fooling the Establishment,” Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2006.
4. “Our Vision, Mission, and Core Principles,” Council on American-Islamic Relations, http://www.caircom.
5. Josh Gerstein, “Islamic Groups Named in Hamas Funding Case,” New York Sun, June 4, 2007.
6. “HLF’s Financial Support of CAIR Garners New Scrutiny,” The Investigative Project on Terrorism, October 12, 2007.
7. “Terror Suit Award Tossed Out; Judge: No Hamas Tie to Teen Slaying Shown,” Chicago Tribune, December 29, 2007; Joseph Kaufman, “Death of a Terror Lobby,” FrontPageMagazine.com, February 3, 2006.
8.”Islamic Association For Palestine (IAP),” DiscoverTheNetwork.org, http://www.discoverthenetworks.org/printgroupProfile.asp?grpid.6215
11. Daniel Pipes and Sharon Chadha, “CAIR: Islamists Fooling the Establishment,” Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2006.
12. Frederic J. Frommer, “Muslim Convert Running For Congress,” Associated Press, September 22, 2006.
13. “Islam Subway Ads Cause Stir in New York,” CNN.com, July 22, 2008. Daniel Pipes, “The Danger Within: Militant Islam in America,”. Commentary, November 2001.
14. “Islam’s Flawed Spokesmen,” Salon, September 26, 2001.
15. Peter Ford, “Listening for Islam’s silent majority,” Christian Science Monitor, November 5, 2001.
16. Liza Porteus, “US Airways Passengers Who Reported ‘Suspicious’ Imam Activity May Be Sued,” FOX News, March 19, 2007. Omar Mohammedi was identified as the President of CAIR-NY in the Speaker Biographies published at the National Association of Muslim Lawyers conference, “Advancing Justice & Empowering the Community,” March 31-April 2, 2006.
17. Major Garrett, “Congress to Protect Citizens Who Report ‘Flying Imams’-Type Suspicions,” FOX News, July 25, 2007.
18. Sarah Downey and Michael Hirsh, “A Safe Haven?,” Newsweek, September 30, 2002. Cited in Daniel Pipes and Sharon Chadha, “CAIR: Islamists Fooling the Establishment,” Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2006.
19. “An Interview with Muslim Brotherhood’s #2, Mohammed Habib,” Pajamas Media, http://pajamasmedia.com/blog/an-interview-with-themuslim-brotherhoods-2/2/.
20. Steven Emerson, “Re: Terrorism and the Middle East Peace Process,” testimony before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Near East and South Asia, March 19, 1996. Cited in Daniel Pipes and Sharon Chadha, “CAIR: Islamists Fooling the Establishment,” Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2006.
21. Steven Pomerantz, “Counterterrorism in a Free Society,” The Journal of Counterterrorism & Security International, Spring 1998. Cited in Daniel Pipes and Sharon Chadha, “CAIR: Islamists Fooling the Establishment,” Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2006.
22. Evan McCormick, “A Bad Day for CAIR,” FrontPageMagazine.com, September 24, 2003.
23. Cinnamon Stillwell, “Savage vs. CAIR: The battle over free speech,” San Francisco Chronicle, December 19, 2007.
24. “9/11 Families’ Suit Thrown Out Again; U.S. Appeals Court Rules Relatives of Sept. 11 Victims Can’t Seek Damages From Saudi Arabia,” Newsday (New York), August 15, 2008; John P. O’Neill vs. Al Baraka. Cited in Daniel Pipes and Sharon Chadha, “CAIR: Islamists Fooling the Establishment,” Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2006.
25. “Teacher Sentenced for Aiding Terrorists,” Washington Post, August 26, 2006; Daniel Pipes and Sharon Chadha, “CAIR: Islamists Fooling the Establishment,” Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2006.
26. Daniel Pipes and Sharon Chadha, “CAIR: Islamists Fooling the Establishment,” Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2006.
27. “Urban Legends,” Council on American-Islamic Relations, January 19, 2007.
29. Daniel Pipes and Sharon Chadha, “CAIR: Islamists Fooling the Establishment,” Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2006.
30. “Urban Legends,” Council on American-Islamic Relations, January 19, 2007.
32. Nicholas K. Geranios, “Second man with ties to University of Idaho arrested,” Associated Press, March 14, 2003. For Khafagi’s position with CAIR, see Carol Eisenberg, “A Troubling Year For Muslims in America,” Newsday, September 2, 2002.
33. Daniel Pipes and Sharon Chadha, “CAIR: Islamists Fooling the Establishment,” Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2006.
34. “Urban Legends,” Council on American-Islamic Relations, January 19, 2007.
35. “Historic Display of Unity: Fiqh Council of North America presents Fatwa denouncing terrorists to Cardinal McCarrick and other religious leaders,” Bridges to Common Ground, November 28, 2007,
36. Fiqh Council of North America, “U.S. Muslim Religious Council Issues Fatwa Against Terrorism,” http://islam.about.com/od/terrorism/a/terrorism_fatwa.htm.
37. “Historic Display of Unity: Fiqh Council of North America presents Fatwa denouncing terrorists to Cardinal McCarrick and other religious leaders,” Bridges to Common Ground, November 28, 2007,
38. “The Killings of Non-Muslims is Legitimate,” November 24, 2006, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=anaHSOB2RFm4.
39. Suzanne Goldenberg, “‘It’s gone beyond hostility,'” The Guardian, August 12, 2002.
40. “Arab Liberals: Prosecute Clerics Who Promote Murder,” Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2005.
41. “Al-Qaradawi full transcript,” BBC News, July 8, 2004.
42. “Director of London’s Al-Maqreze Centre for Historical Studies Hani Sibai: There are No ‘Civilians’ in Islamic Law; The Bombing is a Great Victory for Al-Qa’ida, Which ‘Rubbed the Noses of the World’s 8 Most Powerful Countries in the Mud,” Middle East Media Research Institute Special Dispatch Series No. 932, July 12, 2005.
43. Christopher Goffard, “Controversy follows Dennis Prager to Yorba Linda,” Los Angeles Times, January 24, 2007.
44. “MPAC Condemns London Bombings,” Muslim Public Affairs Council, July 7, 2005.
45. “MPAC Challenges Steve Emerson to Release Full Recording,” Muslim Public Affairs Council, July 12, 2005.
46. George Melloan, “Making Muslims Part of the Solution,” Wall Street Journal, March 29, 2005.
47. “Fight Terrorism: Campaign Mission,” Muslim Public Affairs Council, http://www.mpac.orgingcft/campaign-mission/index.php
48. “Al-Qaradawi full transcript,” BBC News, July 8, 2004.
49. “Fight Terrorism: Frequently Asked Questions About MPAC’s National Anti-Terrorism Campaign Campaign Mission,” Muslim Public Affairs Council, http://www.mpac.org/ngcft/faqs/.
50. “Fight Terrorism: Mosque Guidelines Recommendations,” Muslim Public Affairs Council, http://www.mpac.orgingcft/mosque-guidelines/.
51. “Fight Terrorism: Frequently Asked Questions About MPAC’s National Anti-Terrorism Campaign Campaign Mission,” Muslim Public Affairs Council, http://www.mpac.org/ngcft/faqs/.
52. “Fight Terrorism: Mosque Guidelines Recommendations,” Muslim Public Affairs Council, http://www.mpac.org/ngcft/mosque-guidelines/.
53. “A Response to Criticism of ‘Counterproductive Counterterrorism,'” Muslim Public Affairs Council, February 15, 2005, http://www.mpac.org/article.php ?id=210.
54. Muhammad Hisham Kabbani, “Islamic Extremism: A Viable Threat to U.S. National Security,” speech at U.S. Department of State, January 7, 1999.
55. “Arab American Organizations Call for Administrative Action,” May 20, 2004. http://www.arableague-us.org/palestinians_targeted.html.
56. “Apologists or Extremists: Salam al-Marayati,” Investigative Project on Terrorism, http://www.investigativeproject.org/profile/114.
57. Daniel Pipes, “Needed: Muslims against Terror,” Forward, July 16, 1999.
58. Daniel Pipes, “The Rochester Institute of Technology and My Unwillingness to Be ‘Balanced’ at Campus Talks,” DanielPipes.org, December 31, 2004. Updated April 15, 2005.
59. Lee Green, “CAMERA Alert: LA Times Mum on Al-Marayati’s
Record,” Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting in America, June 26, 2000.
60. “ZOA Urges State Dept. To Rescind Invitation To Muslim Extremist Who Has Praised Terrorist Groups,” Zionist Organization of America, January 23, 2002.
61. Robert Spencer, “The Muslim Public Affairs Council’s War on Steve Emerson,” FrontPageMagazine.com, January 12, 2005.
62. “Counterproductive Counterterrorism: How Anti-Islamic Rhetoric is Impeding America’s Homeland Security,” Muslim Public Affairs Council, December 2004.
63. Zachary Block, “One Man’s War on Terror,” Brown Alumni Magazine, November/December 2002.
64. Daniel Pipes, “A Slick Islamist Heads to Jail,” FrontPageMagazine.com, August 3, 2004.
65. “Official: Terrorism suspect attended White House meeting,” CNN, February 23, 2003.
66. Steven Emerson, American Jihad: The Terrorists Living Among Us, Free Press, 2002. Pp. 210-211.
67. Muzaffar Iqbal, “The American Calamity,” The Minaret, May 2002.
68. Hassan Hathout, Maher Hathout, and Fathi Osman, “About the Authors,” In Fraternity: A Message to Muslims in America (The Minaret Publishing House, 1989).
69. The Minaret, March 1998, p. 41.
70. Daniel Pipes, “MPAC, CAIR, and Praising Osama bin Laden,” Front Steven Emerson, “MPAC in Denial About Radicalization of Muslim Youth?,” Counterterrorism Blog, May 23, 2007.
72. Steven Emerson, “Ms. Lekovic…A Dozen Printing Mistakes?,” Counterterrorism Blog, May 30, 2007.
73. “Fight Terrorism: Frequently Asked Questions About MPAC’s National Anti-Terrorism Campaign Campaign Mission,” Muslim Public Affairs Council,